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In its most extreme form, economic and monetary union means a single economy and a
single currency, with centralized economic decision-making. The architects of the
European Economic Community (EEC), who drew up the founding Treaty of Rome in
1958, believed that free trade between the member countries would lead progressively to
greater economic union, but they made no specific provision for its attainment. Instead
they concentrated on achieving a customs union and drew up a 12-year, stage-by-stage plan
for the dismantling of intra-Community customs barrier. But it soon became clear that the
Community could not stop at free trade and that, for their own sakes, the Member States
would have to look beyond their customs union as growing economic interdependence
pointed to the need for greater economic and monetary integration.
1. Interdependence of highly industrialized economies
The customs union, achieved ahead of schedule in July 1968, was a resounding success and
intra-Community trade in goods and services expanded rapidly - now accounting for half
of Member States' total foreign trade as against one third in 1958. During the same
period, Member States' foreign trade increased 275% in real terms and now accounts for
no less than one quarter of gross Community product (ie. one quarter of the aggregate
amount of all services supplied and goods produced in the nine countries). In some
member countries (Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), the share of
foreign trade actually exceeds 50%, while the figure for Denmark is 33%. In the Federal
Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, the share has risen from around 20% to
just under 30%, while in Italy and France the figures are around 25 and 20% respectively.
A quarter of the manufactures, farm products, and services produced by the 258 million
people living in the Community are exported, and, as a result, foreign trade accounts for a
quarter of the. income of the Community s population. However, this crucial last 25% of
their income is highly vulnerable as long as frontier posts remain in existence and as long as
currency exchange rates can fluctuate sharply enough to price a country's products out of
foreign markets altogether. The EEC customs union has eliminated the fear that tariff
barriers between Community countries might be restored overnight against member
countries' goods, perhaps depriving entire industries of their export markets. By contrastit has not managed to prevent excessive exchange rate fluctuations, which can have a
similar, if not greater, di~ruptive impact on trade than customs duties. As a result, intra-
Community trade is still fraught with uncertainty despite the fact that the customs union has
brought about an unprecedented degree of interdependence between the Member States of
what i~ a highly industrialized Community.
The fact that the Member States already carry out 50% of their foreign trade with one
another reflects a degree of mutual reliance never before witnessed in history. Indeed,
Ireland and the three Benelux countries carry out between two-thirds and three-quarters
and France, Italy, Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany half of their trade with
other member countries. The United Kingdom is the exception, transacting two-third~ of
its foreign trade with non-member countries.
Given this high degree of interdependence, a customs union alone cannot provide the
neces~ary long-term security: one pillar cannot suffice indefinitely to support the edifice
formed by the objectives laid down in the Treaty, namely improvement and alignment of
living standards and uniform development of all regions without structural imbalances and
di~tortion~ to competition. To this end, what is needed is the economic union which is
advocated in the Preamble to the Rome Treaty and which itself cannot be attained without
monetary union. Only within such a union can the convertibility of all member countries
currencies at fixed exchange rates be guaranteed thus. preventing money market
fluctuations distorting competition and intra-Community trade.
The authors of the Treaty were quite content initially to urge in general trems coordination
of monetary policy 'to the full extent needed for the functioning of .the common market'
with each Member State undertaking to 'pursue the economic policy needed to ensure the
equilibrium of its overall balance of payments and to maintain confidence in its currency,
while taking care to ensure a high level of employment and a stable level of prices . In
addition, each member country was to regard its exchange rate policy 'as a matter of
common concern It was only at the summit conferences of the Heads of State or of
Government held in the Hague in December 1969 and in Paris in October 1972 that the
objective of creating an economic and monetary union within ten years and also of striving
to achieve European Union was defined in concrete terms.
Securing growth and full employment
This major venture had, however, to be embarked on in the midst of a major crisis in the
international monetary system by a Community that was also preparing for the accession of
Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland. With little or no synchronization of national
economies and no Community exchange rate system to ensure monetary cohesion, the
currencies of the nine Member States making up the newly-enlarged Community also
diverged in the wake of the successive international monetary crises.
Those Member States whose currencies were substantially revalued were compelled to
adjust their economies to the higher rate, to neglect branches of the economy with lower
value added and to undertake as much rationalization as possible. As a result, they now
possess an efficient and modern industrial structure but for the time being there is a serious
shortage of customers for their sophisticated products andservice~. The Member StatesMrd
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international comparison, they had become poorer in that they had to pay more for their
imports and received less for their exports. Some of them found that they could no longer
earn sufficient foreign exchange to purchase the tempting goods and services their partners
had to sell. Consequently, they were also unable to press ahead with investment and
rationalization schemes, having instead to tighten their belts even when their partners
granted them credits. The result was that strong-currency and weak-currency countries hit
the trough of the recession together. They have striven --- in vain  ever since to get their
economies back onto a secure and steady growth path.
For the surplus countries to help pull their partners out of the recession, they need to be
able to count on sustained expansion in demand at least within the Community which at the
same time is not continually being wracked by monetary upheaval. Accordingly, economic
and monetary policies need to be worked out in common in order to achieve growth and
stability within a wider economic framework than the purely national one. Because of the
Cornmunity s substantial involvement in international trade, greater growth and stability
within the Community cannot only help its component member countries, but also benefit
the rest of the world.
The existence of an economic and monetary union requires joint control of the money
supply, that is to say of the bloodstream that feeds the circulatory flow of economic
activity. It also implies joint management of the exchange rate which governs the com-
petitiveness of Community exports and which in turn determines our economic relations
with the rest of the world. Were each Member State to regulate its money supply as it saw
fit, no common economic policy would be possible. The paths of our economies would be
bound to diverge, and any common front shown towards the rest of the world would then
certainly be more apparent than real.
Studies by experts have shown that economic and monetary union in an advanced phase
would be liable in the Community with a budget of between 5 and 7% of the combined
national products and indeed, in the pre-union phase, with one of between 2 and 3% of
that aggregate. A budget of this size would provide sufficient resources to finance the
transfers necessary to guarantee a more consistent development of economically backward
regimes and thus ensure more rapid growth for all. There would, moreover, be no need to
pursue the ambitious objective of a federal state modelled on the United States, where, for
historical reasons many responsibilities have been centralized and the federal budget
accounts for as much as 20% of national product.
Clearly much would depend on the economically stronger member countries being willing
to pay more into the common budget than they get out of it so as to assist the weaker
members. The latter, understandably, are unlikely to be enthusiastic about a Community
that lacks this kind of solidarity. Accounting for just under 1 % of national product, the
present Community budget is still too small to allow of solidarity of this kind, especially
since the bulk of the resources available has to be used, not for harmonizing structures, but
for financing the common agricultural policy.THE COMMUNITY' IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
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In its still incomplete form, there is another field in whiCh the European Community is
failing to play the role that the other industrialized countries and developing countries are
entitled to expect of a grouping with such lofty political and economic objectives  that of
external relations. The reform of the international monetary system still left the dollar as
the sole world currency. Less than 4% of the world's foreign exchange reserves are held in
the form of the Special Drawing Right, the neutral and jointly administered world currency
of the International Monetary Fund. However, the dollar is no longer sufficiently strong
to shoulder alone, on behalf of the rest of the world, the responsibilities associated with a
key reserve currency in wliich all countries can safely denominate their assets.
On the other hand, the Community as a whole is big enough to create a second strong
world currency that can help to underpin the international monetary system. The Nine
constitute an entity that is of the optimum size advocated by economic theorists for a single
currency area. Together the Member States could develop into one of the major currency
areas in a future world economic system that has a stronger regional bias.
If there were a strong well-managed reserve currency in Europe other than the dollar
industrialized countries, oil-exporting countries and developing countries would no longer
need to fear the depreciation of their foreign exchange reserves. They would be able to
choose the currency in which to hold their reserves, and this would afford them a greater
degree of certainty as regards the long-term planning of their development and investment
programmes. Their orders would, with greater regularity, be channelled to the established
industrialized countries.
The United States and Europe would be compelled to manage their currencies properly
since the other countries would have a choice of reliable reserve currencies unlike under the
present system of narrow-based national currencies. A policy of 'benign neglect', of which
the US monetary authorities have been accused in recent years as regards the dollar, would
no longer be conceivable. If the exchange rates of the majbr world currencies could no
longer fluctuate as widely as they have done of late, this would create conditions much
more favourable to long-term export business and investment decisions, thereby enhancing
appreciably the prospects for continuing steady growth in a world economy free from the
recessions suffered in the last few years.
Safeguarding the Community's achievements to date
An economic and monetary union is desirable from the point of view of securing a steady
growth path within the Community and resolving the crisis within the world monetary
system. Without it, the Community's achievements to date could not be safeguarded in
the long term. The general customs union established in the II 960s, including that part of
it  the common market in farm products  which was most difficult to put together
would, be placed in extreme jeopardy if it proves impossible to prevent Member States
currencies from developing along divergent paths. As past events have shown on more
than one occasion, member countries experiencing balance of payments difficulties have
had, in these circumstances, to. resort to quasi-legal administrative measures to curb, orTOTAL EC TRADE
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1977make more expensive, imports from their Community trading partners. The danger of a
return to this kind of non-tariff protectionism cannot be averted unless a currency union is
established within the Community.
The common market in agricultural products, which is managed on the basis of uniform
prices (calculated in fixed units of account), nowadays owes its continued existence to
makeshift measures such as monetary compensatory arrangements. The countries with
appreciating currencies are unable to persuade their farmers readily to accept the income
losses they are bound to incur in the event of revaluation vis-a-vis the unit of account. 
the other hand, the countries with depreciating currencies cannot persuade their consumers
readily to accept the increases in the import prices of essential foodstuffs associated with
any devaluation. And so, we now find, alongside the exchange rates applied generally,
special deviating increasingly over time from the normal exchange rates. This gives rise; at
the dividing line between industry and agriculture  ie. the line represented by the
numerous farm products that are processed by industry, ranging from tinned ham to
chocolate  to distortions in competition and to complications that have to be offset by
special compensatory mechanisms. The differing taxes on consumption apart, it is these
mechanisms that are responsible for the fact we find ourselves not in a tax-free and duty-
free economic area but in a customs union in which officials are still overworked and
exporters and importers almost strangled by red tape.
Enlargement entails consolidation
The more countries join the Community, the more difficult it will be to hold together a
customs union that has not graduated to the status of an economic and monetary
union. The Community, which has set itself the task of admitting as members in the first
half of the coming decade three Southern European countries (Greece, Portugal and
Spain), must take the qualitative leap forward towards a monetary union if enlargement is
not to result in the achievements made so far being watered down or forfeited
altogether. A currency mechanism attempting to equalize the daily fluctuations of twelve
currencies would have little in common with a genuine customs union and would be
virtually impossible to manage. The prospective Member States hope to gain muc~ from
membership of the Community but their hopes are likely to be cruelly disappointed. In
their own interests and in those of the existing member countries, the prospective members
must join a fully operational Community that has set itself definite objectives and gives the
countries definite objectives as well.
II - WHAT ARE THE BARRIERS TO ATTAINMENT OF ECONOMIC AND
MONETARY UNION?
Absence of democratic structures
In its Member States' interests and in the interests of the world .economy,. the Community
must evolve into an economic and monetary union, but this cannot be imposed on theCommunity overnight by a single stroke of the pen. As past events have shown, it cannot
even be achieved by way of detailed stage-by-stage plans laid down in advance.
The governments and political parties of the individual Member States still retain re-
sponsibility for the formulation of national economic policy and remain answerable to their
respective electorates for: the consequences, especially if these include unemployment and
inflation. Before they can transfer responsibility for economic and monetary policy to
. European-level bodies, governments must be certain that these bodies can and will
discharge these responsibilities properly. The man in the street must know for certain that
his democratic rights will be safeguarded at European level too.
For this reason, direct elections to the European Parliament and a European Monetary
Union are conditional upon one another. An economic and monetary union comprising
states grouped together on the basis of freedom is inconceivable in the absence of direct
legitimacy conferred by a body having powers of democratic control. pn the other hand, a
directly elected European Parliament would in the long term be relegated to a position of
impotence if it had no scope for influency the key issues of economic and monetary
policy. This does not detract from the need for a European Central Bank that enjoys a
sufficient degree of independence vis- vis the political authorities. The European Central
Bank and the bodies responsible for economic policy must be established in such a way that
they are able to operate at Community level as effectively as the most efficient national
authorities.
Marked economic disparities
In addition to gradual development of democratic structures, a further  sine qua non  for
economic and monetary union is a basic consensus on the external and internal economic
ends to be pursued and on the means to be employed for this purpose. Achieving such a
consensus is not a straightforward matter in a Community which is marked by wide regional
disparities as regards development, whose Member States have such different historical
backgrounds and in which the role played by government in the economy also varies very
widely from country to country. Recollecting the past, people in some countries take
fright at the mere thought of unemployment while, at the same time, they take a bout of
inflation fully in their stride. By contrast, people in other countries are, from experience
allergic to .a rate of inflation running at more than 3 - 4%.
The countries that have already brought inflation under control are reluctant to enter into
any commitments vis-a-vis the countries that are still fighting two-figure or high one-figure
rates of inflation. Indeed, they are anxious lest, as part of a union, they should catch the
same disease. By contrast, the countries with high rates of inflation are afraid that they
might be forced too abruptly into a stable-price Community within which they would have
to sacrifice their growth prospects. Their fear is that a monetary union might dash their
chances of catching up economically with other countries by imposing the same pace of
development for all and thus freezing existing economic disparities.
It is, however, common knowledge that high rates of inflation do not lend themselves to
coordination. Nor are they  to say the least  conducive to steady growth in the long
term. Therefore, there must be no slackening in the successful efforts made in recentSHARE OF WORLD TRADE
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including intra -Community tradeyears to bring down the rates of inflation that got out of hand during the oil crisis. The
higher rates must be slowly and cautiously eased back to the average level of inflation in the
stability-conscious Member States. Inflation rates can be aligned, but only downwards, on
the rates recorded in the low-inflation countries. As a root cause of disease, inflation
must, like any other inflammation, be attacked and cured without damaging healthy parts
of the patient's body by unduly drastc action.
Once inflation has been contained and the conditions created for fostering balance of
payments equilibrium, the achievement of more vigorous growth in the less developed
countries will no longer be hampered by the fact that, after each promising upswing, these
countries have been obliged time and time again to take deflationary action. What  will 
necessary, in these circumstances, will be for the Community to arrange the necessary
transfer of resources and provide graduated investment incentives with a view to putting
these countries and regions on the road to more rapid growth.
Mr Roy Jenkins, the President of the European Commission, drew attention to these
interrelationships when delivering the Jean Monnet lecture to the European University
Institute in Florence in October 1977. However, it was only the following year that his
urgent appeal to Member States' governments to set out with determination along the road
towards economic and monetary union met with a . response.
Fears of another failure
Economists who had been asked by the European Commission in 1975 for their views on
the obstacles to economic and monetary union laid the blame mainly on the Governments
lack of political will. Like showjumpers, however, Goverrunents shy away from fences that
seem too high for them. They were all the more cautious because of the failure of the first
attempt made in the 19608 to achieve economic and monetary union, by way of a stage-by-
stage plan. While Member States' economies could not be brought more closely into line
and while growth and inflation rates diverged so widely, the Governments would not
attempt to clear the major fence in front of them. They were afraid that another 'refusal'
would pose a major threat to what had been achieved so far and could cost the Community
a good deal of its credibility. Any new initiatives contemplated by policy-makers on the
monetary front require very careful preparation and adequate safeguards ensuring support
and cooperation from the 'real' economy. This is because nothing is more sensitive to
inadequate improvisation than a currency. 
But in April 1978, with efforts to bring Member States' inflation rates more closely into
line beginning to produce effects, the President of the French Republic and the German
Chancellor, at the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen, put forward their own
proposals for the establishment of a new European Monetary System (EMS) which, as we
shall see, would once again embrace all Member States, with each of them playing a full part. III ~ WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED?
Although the attempt to create an economic and monetary union by way of a stage-by~
stage plan spanning ten years ended in failure, it would be a mistake to belittle what had
been achieved even prior to launching of the European Monetary System. In the four
strategic areas of monetary policy, economic policy, the efforts to build up a common
capital market, and tax harmonization, substantial progress had already been made and
important work carried out with a view to further development. And so the scene is set
for, and the machinery is ready to launch, a new, well-prepared initiative.
Monetary Policy
(a)  European exchange rate system
The Monetary Committee, which was set up twenty years ago, and the Committee of
Govemors of the Central Banks, which came into being in 1964, are the specialist bodies
responsible for coordinating monetary policy within the Community. The essential
component of the European exchange rate system, the currency snake, is the outcome of
the first major attempt to create an economic and monetary union, launched in 1969.
At the request of the Member States' Governments, a group of experts chaired by the then
Luxembourg Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Pierre Werner, produced in 1970 a
stage-by-stage plan for economic and monetary unioin based on a blue print previously
drawn up by the European Comrnission.
In March 1971, the Governments adopted the main short-term proposals put forward by
the Group without, however, endorsing its more far-reaching longer-term political im-
plications. The approach advocated in the Werner Plan and in the two ensuing Council
Resolutions dated March 1971 and March 1972 centred on the gradual reduction of
exchange rate fluctuations between Member States' currencies.
While the major world currencies were preparing in 1972/73 for the changeover to un-
restricted floating, the Member States of the Community were keen to limit the margin
within which their currencies were allowed to deviate from one another to 2.25%. The
intention was to underpin monetary cohesion within the Community. The Member States
were to be given a yardstick against which they would be able to assess their economic
policies. A coordinated stabilization policy was to be pursued to ensure that the margin of
only 2.25% was observed against a background of a generalized floating of currencies.
Provision was made for coordinated intervention to support currencies that were
temporarily in danger of being unable to keep within the lower limit of the margin of
fluctuation. The central bank of a country whose currency found itself in this precarious
position was to sell other currencies and purchase its own currency on the foreign exchange
markets in order to hold its rate steady. The central banks in the other member countries
were also committed to purchasing the threatened currency in order to support it. In the
normal course of events, there was to be an unlimited obligation to intervene on theMrd
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JAPANexchanges. The currency credits granted to the country with the threatened currency by its
patners were, as a rule, to be paid back within four to eight weeks unless, that is, they were
consolidated for longer periods under the support mechanisms available. If the day-to-day
fluctutaions in the exchange rates of the currencies taking part in the Community exchange
rate system are plotted on a graph, they produce a snake-like ribbon the width of which
varies depending on the gap between the strongest and the weakest currency. Hence, the
Community exchange rate system is also referred to as 'the snake
In practice, however, not all the Member States were able to live up to the highly ambitious
objective underlying the Community exchange rate system at a time of hectic fluctuations in
the world's currencies, particularly the dollar. In the course of time, the United Kingdom
and Ireland (June 1972), Italy, (February 1973), and France (January 1974 and, after
re-entering for a short while, again in March 1976) and the associated non-member
countries, Sweden (August 1977) and Norway (December 1978), withdrew from the
snake. The member countries that belonged to the snake on the eve of the changeover to
the EMS were the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg.
Despite all the monetary pressures it has encountered, the Community exchange rate
system has not deviated from its objectives and has ensured that these will also be adhered
to within the EMS. Admittedly, the central rates of the currencies remaining in the snake
have had to be adjusted on several occasions. The requirement that they must endeavour
at all times to remain within the margin of fluctuation prescribed has been a great help to
the countries particpating in the exchange rate system in their efforts to achieve their
stabilization goals. At the same time, it has made for close economic policy coordination
between the countries able to keep their exchange rates in step without unduly large
adjustments. This has been particularly true of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Benelux countries.
Establisiunent of the main monetary cooperation mechanisms in the Community 
including the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, the European unit of account and the
monetmy support mechanisms  was attributable directly or indirectly, or linked, to the
European Exchange rate system (the snake).
(b)  European Monetary Cooperation Fund
The European Monetary Cooperation Fund was set up in April 1973 and since then has
been concerned primarily with managing the Community exchange rate system (the snake)
and the Community s short-term monetary support mechanism. It is through the Fund
that the currency credits made available by Member States for currency support measures
are settled.
Under the new European Monetary System (EMS) agreed in December 1978, the Fund
will continue, in the initial phase, to settle balances connected with intervention and short-
term monetary support. In addition, it will issue European currency units (known as
ECU' ) against deposit by Member States of a given proportion of their gold and foreign
exchange reserves. After two years, it is to be gradually consolidate into a genuine
European Monetary Fund which will manage, on behalf of the Community, part of Member
States' gold and foreign exchange reserves.
1.8(c)  Short-term monetary support and medium-term financial assistance
Dose cooperation between Member States on the monetary policy front requires financing
mechanisms that provide short-term support for action taken to maintain the cohesion of
the European exchange rate system and that provide medium-term relief for member
countries with balance of payments problems. At times of nervousness on foreign
exchange markets, the exchange rates of the Member States' currencies can be kept within
the desired naiTow margin of fluctuation by intervention on the part of the monetary
authorities. Under a system of short-term monetary support set in place as early as
February 1970, the Central Banks grant one another three-month credits for the purpose of
financing such support measures or helping member countries cope with temporary balance
of payments deficits. These credits are renewable for a further three months.
system of medium-term financial assistance under which foreign currency credits are
granted to a country for a period of between two and five years to help it overcome balance
of payments deficits was adopted in March 1971. While short-term support is granted
unconditionally, medium-term balance of payments assistance is conditional upon the
recipient Member State taking steps to tackle effectively the causes of its payments
deficit. In December 1977, when the volume of credit available under this system was
doubled, measures were also taken to ensure closer supervision of compliance with the
economic policy conditions laid down in connection with the grant of credits. Credits are
granted in instalrnents or 'tranches' and the Council announces the release of each new
tranche only after it has been shown that the debtor country has, in the preceding period,
complied with the economic policy conditions set. This procedure is designed to foster the
adjustment process in Member States which, for balance of payments reasons, have sought
assistance from their partners. Member States have not the slightest intention of operating
the two support mechanisms described above in isolation from the solidarity arrangements
that have been made at international level: whenever the Community's support mechanisms
are to be used, account is taken of the forms of assistance that may be available from other
sources, e.g. the International Monetary Fund.
Member States' contributions to the Community support mechanisms are restricted to a
specific amount. Each country is allocated quotas within which it can count on support
(debtor quotas) or is itself required to provide support (creditor quotas).
further instrument for assisting countries in balance of payments difficulties was
introduced in February 1975, when, in the wake of the oil price increases, some Member
States were forced to run up substantial current account deficits. Acting ona proposal
from the Commission, the Council of Ministers decided to authorize the issue of
Community loans on the international financial markets. Italy and Ireland received
additional balance of payments assistance financed out of the yield from these loans. The
Commission has also requested authorization from the Council to issue Community loans
the proceeds of which will be used to tide member countries over balance of payments
difficulties, even where these are no longer directly attributable to the oil price increases.
(d)  European unit of account
Since its inception, the European Community has had to calculate Member States
payments to the Community budget and their reciprocal commitments and obligations byGROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT MARKET PRICES *
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pet inhabitant at current prices and exchange rates)reference toa unit of account. At the time when exchange rates between Member States
were fixed and based on a gold parity, the unit of account could be expressed by an amount
fixed once and for all in terms of the national currencies. But once the leading
industrialized countries decided to allow their exchanges rates to fluctuate on a day-to-day
basis, the Community was compelled to devise a unit of account that took account of
changes in the currencies' effective values.
In April 1975, a European unit of account (EUA), made up of a composite 'basket' of the
nine Member States' currencies, was introduced. Each currency was allocated a specific
weighting in the basket, reflecting the economic importance of the Member State con-
cerned. The value oftheEUA  expressed in each of the Member States' currencies and
in the other major international currencies on the basis of the quotations given on the
official foreign exchange markets  is calculated each day by the Commission.
The Community possesses, in the shape of the EUA, a practical.accounting instrument that
enables it to evaluate Member States' commitments and obligations according to their real
value. Slowly but surely, use of the EUA as an accounting device is being extended to an
extended to an increasing number of fields. Since 1975, it has been applied in connection
with the European Development Fund, set up to assist the 53 African, Caribbean and
Pacific. (ACP) countries that are signatories with the Community to the Lome
Convention. The European Investment Bank in Luxembourg also uses the new unit for its
balance sheet and for its loan operations. In 1978, the Community drew up its own
b~dget for the first time in EVA.
Although, at present, the EVA is first and foremost an accounting instrument, the
Commission maintains interest-bearing! balances expressed in EVA in banks in several
Member States with.a :view to maintaining the value of its budget resources. The EUA is
not yet used as an instrumentior effecting payments. Under the new European Monetary
System (EMS), agreed in December 1978, the EVA was renarned the ECV and assigned
new functions. Tl:wname 'ECU" goes back to the old gold and silver coins that were in
circulation in France for several hundred years.
Coordination of economic policy
Although currencies and the exchange rates between them determine trade relationships
they are necessarily, in their turn, a reflection of underlying economic realities. The
Community endeavours to influence the exchange rates that obtain between Member
States' currencies in such a way as to bring about a greater degree of convergence between
national economies. Thus, monetary policy is not an end in itself but an instrument for
working towards the real objective  closer alignment of national economies and removal
of regional and structural disparities where the latter are incompatible with an economic
umon.
To further this aim, the Commission began issuing annual economic policy
recommendations tQ Member States as early as the 1960s. Moreover, as of July 1969, a
Member State contemplating important short-term economic policy decisions or measures
likely to have a substantial impact on the economies of other member countries, or on the
situation in the Mernber State concerned, has been required under a Council decision to
hold prior consultations.Since 1971, the Council has carried out a twice-yearly examination of the economic
situation in the Community, based on communications from the Commission, and had
drawn up short-term economic policy guidelines to be obeserved by the Community and by
each individual Member State in the interests of harmonious economic development.
Each year, the Commission presents a report on the economic situation which is adopted by
the Council and is intended as a guide for Member States' economic and budgetary policy
decisions.
In 1974, the objectives underlying economic policy convergence and the resulting economic
policy requirements imposed on Member States were given clearer shape in a basic
directive on stability, growth and full employment and in a decision concerning the
convergence of economic policies. To promote closer economic policy coordination, a
special Coordinating Group was set up within the Council in 1972 which brings together
Commission representatives and representatives of the competent ministry in each Member
State. Moreover, in 1974, the three separate committees responsible at the time for short~
term economic policy, for medium-term economic policy .an'd for budgetary policy were
merged into a single committee, with sub-committees, with a view to promoting' more
effective coordination.
Despite these more sophisticated arrangements, the goal of improved coordination of
economic policies 9ould not be achieved during the troubled economic times that came in
the wake of the oil crisis. Inflation got out of hand in 1974 and 1975 in several Member
States and it was only during 1977 and 1978 that efforts made to narrow the span of
inflation rates among Member States, which had ranged up to between 6% and 25%, were
successful enough to halve this gap. In addition, reducing the currerit account disparities
between the strong-currency and weak-currency member countries is proving to be a
laborious process and also.a painful one in that it had to be launched in 1975 at a time of
declining growth rates throughout the world and had to be supported in the ensuing years
when economies were recovering only at a faltering pace.
Stroctuml policy
(a)  Medium-term programmes (covering five years)
From 1964 onwards, the Community's medium-term and longer-term economic policy
objectives have been formulated by. a Medium-term Economic Policy Committee and
submitted by the Commission to the Council for approval in the form of programmes. The
programIlles have contained not only quantitative growth targets but also qualitative
structural and social policy objectives.
This has been by no means a simple matter in a Community in which some Member States
placed their faith first and foremost in market forces whereas others advocated a greater
degree of economic planning. Thanks to the medium-term programmes drawn up,
economic forecasting techniques applied in Member States have become more
comparable. Indeed, the planning work and the associated coordinating work have forged
closer cross-frontier links between government departments and promoted mutual under-standing of the different concepts and methods applied. By contrast, it has not been
possible in all Member States to put fully into practice at economic policy level the
objectives laid down in the medium-term programmes, and, as a result, these have been
implemented only in piecemeal fashion.
(b)  Regional and industrial policies
The major structural disparities between the national. economies and the major regional
development disparities within the individual Member States can be remedied neither by a
coordinated short-term economic policy nor by medium-tenD programmes alone. What is
needed is a genuine transfer of resources from the richer to the poorer regions of the
Community .
The key instrument for equalizing regional disparities is intended to be the Regional Fund
which, however, was only set up in 1974 and has since had to be content with an admittedly
growing but as yet modest budget. The Fund was allotted a budget of 1 500 million units
of account in its first three years of activity, from 1975 to 1977, and has a budget of 1850
million EUA for its second three-year period of activity, from 1978 to 1980. In the
Fund's early years, Community funds could normally be granted only in the form of back-
up assistance for Member States' existing national development programmes. It is only in
the next few years that specific measures are to be taken at Community level to improve
regional structures which take greater account than in the past of the Community'
objectives and needs.
Industrial policy, as well as regional policy, has an important contribution to make to
structural improvement. A common market signifies change and renovation. Industries
that have found themselves isolated without a future behind national frontiers must adjust
to a wider, unrestricted market and encouragement must be given to the creation of new
forward-looking industries and service branches. The Community must foster the
continuing adjustment process, without which uncompetitive industries would be kept
artificially alive. A retreat into protectionism and the re-emergence of barriers between
markets would then be unavoidable. The Community must, however, see to it that
redundant workers are reabsorbed into the economic system with the help of the Social
Fund and the adjustment provisions laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community. The Cornmunity has, in fact, already done a great deal to help
redeploy hundreds of thousands of workers who had lost their jobs and has also helped to
make life easier for workers retiring early.
(c)  Financing instruments
Financing new jobs and promoting structural change requires large amounts of investment
credits which, in the normal course of events, are provided by existing financial institutions
and the financial institutions and the financial markets. The Community, however, must
proffer its assistance and help finance the creation of new jobs at least in those areas where
the Common Market is speeding up. the pace of structural change and contributing to the
more rapid closure of obsolete plant.OFFICIAL RESERVES
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JULY  1978The European Investment Bank was set up in 1958 primarily with a view to helping to
develop the Community s less favoured areas. It is designed as an instrument for financing
plant modernization or conversion schemes or job-creation schemes and for providing
Member States with financial assistance for joint projects of Community interest. Since its
inception the Em had granted credits of more than 10000 million EUA and has, in recent
years, stepped up its lefiding operations to an annual rate of around 1 500 million EUA.
Under the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, which came into
force in 1952, the then High Authority and the present Commission, as its successor, have
mad~ available to the coal and steel industry credits amounting to over 4 500 million
EUA. The coal industry had to contend with major conversion difficulties in the early
years, just as the steel industry also now faces a major over-capacity problem.
In 1976, the Council authorized the Commission to issue loans totalling 500 million EUA
each year for the purpose of financing the construction of nuclear power stations and
thereby, going some way towards meeting the Community's future energy requirements.
In mid-1978, as its contribution towards combating economic stagnation and resolving the
structural crises affecting several industrial sectors, the Council of Ministers authorized the
Commission to float loans amounting to over 1 000 million EUA on the international
financial markets. The European Investment Bank is responsible for managing the credit
operations on behalf of and in conjunction with the Commission. This has provided the
Community with a further  admittedly limited  source of funds to promote and
facilitate structural change.
Through the Guidance and Guarantee Sections of the European Agricultural Fund, the
Commission each year allocates some 1 000 million EUA to improving agricultural
structures. This makes it easier for farmers to change over to modern production methods
and to the kind of high-value products for which there are ready ~arkets.
Free movement of capital
There can be no economic and monetary union or common market without the free
movement of capital, allowing investors to move funds at will to the places where the beit
yields are available. In a large, free-entreprise economic entity with balanced structur
maximum return on investment should reflect maximum economic utility.
The Community, however, still has a long way to go before it can be described as 
common market with balanced structures. The countries with the weaker structures and
currencies thus attempt to curb the outflow of domestic savings by imposing bans and
controls on such movements of capital. Their currencies and econon,ic. prospects are not
sufficiently sound and attractive to encourage an inflow of enough private capital from
other Member States. Since it has not been possible to bring economic structures more
closely into line, the liberalization of capital movements has also not proceeded much
beyond the initial measures provided for in the two relevant directives adopted in 1960 and
1962. Although these .directives have facilitated trade between Member States
cross-frontier payments of wages anq salaries and of fees, cross-frontier payments effected
in respect of services rendered, and the granting of short-term and medium-term tradecredits by prohibiting restrictions on such capital movements, the granting of financial
credits for industrial investments, capital investments and cross-frontier dealings in quoted
securities have still not been entirely liberalized.
Instead of forming a common capital market on which surplus savings in the richer
countries and regions are transferred to the poorer countries and regions, national markets
are still isolated from one another. As a result, the so-called Euromarkets, on which
operations involving international foreign currency credits are transacted, have become the
main channel for capital movements. On these markets,. however, weak-currency
countries have to borrow in hard currencies since their own vulnerable currencies are not
acceptable to the market. Further progress towards liberalization of capital movements
will be achieved only gradually, as progress is made in the other fields appertaining to
economic and monetary union.
Tax hannomzanon
In the field of tax harmonization too, there has really been only one important milestone
namely the abolition of the cumulative turnover tax, the full burden of which fell on every
product at every level of distribution and which served to restrict and distort most
drastically not only free movement of goods but also competition. The cumulative
turnover taxes have been replaced by value added tax systems in all Member States.
Value added tax (VAT) is levied at each distribution level only on the increase in value
contributed at that level and the overall burden of taxation is no longer a function of the
number of distribution levels a product passes through before reaching the ultimate
consumer.
But there is still a long way to go before VAT systems and rates are harmonized. The
standard rate of tax in the individual Member States ranges between 10% and 23%.
There are even greater disparities as regards exemptions, reduced rates for essential goods
and increased rates for luxury goods. These remaining disparities and the various excise
duties, particularly on spirits, tobacco and oil, continue to hamper the free movement of
goods. They are the cause of the queues of lorries we see at the Community s internal
frontiers and of the customs checks imposed on travellers since these tax differentials must
be accounted for at frontiers by tax refunds in the exporting country and taxation in the
importing country.
For ordinary travellers, the Commission has been able to introduce exemptions, at least for
the quantities normally allowed through for tourists.
For revenue purposes, some member countries prefer to rely most on indirect taxes on
consumption and apply correspondingly high VAT and excise duty rates, while others
derive the bulk of their revenue from high direct taxes on income and wealth. These
differences of emphasis are determined by deep-rooted .historical and psychological
considerations. They can be remedied only if economic structures are gradually brought
more closely into line.
No action has yet been possibl~ as regards harmonization of direct taxes on firms
particularly corporation tax and depreciation rules. The Commission has had to con-centrate, first of all, on those direct taxes that constituted substantial barriers to the free
movement of capital and to investment. For this reason, it is focusing its efforts on
abolishing fOnDS of tax discrimination between parent companies and subsidiaries operating
in different member countries, on taxes imposed on dividends, on the special forms of
withholding tax and on combating tax avoidance and evasion in so far as such efforts can be
of value in helping to complete a customs union which has still not been taken on to the
stage of economic and monetary union. 
IV - THE NEW EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM (EMS)
Return  to monetary cohesion
Implementation of the stage-by-stage plan for creating an economic and monetary union
out of the Community as it stands at present has not proved possible during the
1970s. The difficulties the individual Member States have had to contend with have
shown that economic and monetary union is now neither less important nor less essential
than before. With half of their imports and exports coming from or going to their
Community partners and with their foreign trade accounting for one-quarter of the
Community' s national product, the member countries are already heavily dependent upon
one another and the interpenetration of their economies is far advanced. The
Community's internal trading area, the future of which is in our own hands, rnust now be
made secure and the danger of a retreat into protectionism within Europe, which looms
. larger with every day of delay, removed once and for all.
The Community must return to a path of growth and price stability. Without stability,
Member States will struggle along divergent paths as inflation increasingly undermines the
prosperity of some of them without the others seeing any improvement in their
situation. This is because without adequate growth the weak-currency countries are
unable to purchase enough goods and services from their partners to prevent the mass of
unemployed expanding throughout the Community. In recent years, some member
countries have had, time and time again, to cut back on the orders they placed with their
partners because they were running out of the currency reserves needed to settle
invoices. Inexorably, workers in other rnember countries lost their jobs.
Member countries could, simply by pooling part of their reserves, avert the most damaging
consequences of permanent stop-go policies as a result of which several member countries
are, in effect, having to live from hand to mouth.
The year 1977 brought a revival of interest in the objective of economic and monetary
union ~ an ambition which had appeared to have been shelved. Following the watershed
speech by Commission President, Roy Jenkins, in Florence, which was designed to remind
Member States' Governments of the merits of a single . eurrency, the Commission laid
before the Council at the end of 1977 an action programme for the years ahead. This
programme was aimed at steering the Community back onto a path of growth and stability
the prerequisites for any monetary. union ~ by way of closer coordination of economic
and monetary policies.BALANCE OF PAYM ENTS
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JAPANThe year 1978 then saw the launching of a practical  albeit limited  initiative by the
Franch President and the German Chancellor to set up a European Monetary System. All
three meetings of the European Council of Heads of State or Government held in 1978
were dominated by this subject. At the April meeting in Copenhagen, the plan was
discussed for the first time. At the July meeting in Bremen, basic features were approved
and, at the December meeting in Brussels, the resolution was adopted in which the Heads
of State or Government of all nine countries expressed their support for the new system.
The new European Monetary System must not be confused with the projected economic
and monetary union, let alone with a common currency. Its immediate limited objective is
to create a zone of monetary stability in Europe by closer monetary policy cooperation. 
will initially be used like the European exchange rate system as an instrument for
combating excessive fluctuations in exchange rates and hence for reducing a factor of
uncertainty in trade and payments between Member States. In addition, through a more
stable exchange rate policy, it will endeavour to create room for an economic policy geared
to achieving a greater measure of internal and external stability for both deficit and surplus
countries.
The ECU as the pillar of the system
The system combines well-tried practices from the currency snake and a new ECU-based
procedure for keeping currencies more closely in line than previously and for averting
divergences. The ECU, which lies at the centre of the European Monetary System, will be
used as the denominator or numeraire for the exchange rate mechanism, as the basis for a
divergence indicator, as the denominator for operations in the intervention and credit
mechanisms and as a means of settlement between monetary authorities. It will thus
become the new European unit of account, which is not yet a generally accepted means of
payment but is intended to be used increasingly as a means of payment, initially between
Member States' Central Banks and subsequently perhaps in connection with international
capital movements. The ECU is a basket of the nine Member States' currencies, with the
amount of each currency in the basket corresponding to the economic importance of the
country in question. In this way, the weight of each currency influences the value of the
ECU basket, which is calculated each day by the Commission on the basis of quotations on
the relevant national foreign exchange markets. As in the snake, a grid of bilateral
exchange rates has been established restricting the margin of fluctuation to 2.25% either
way. Only Italy has opted to apply initially a wider margin of 6%. When a currency is
threatening to leave the grid as its exchange rate fluctutaes by more than 2.25% (or 6% in
the case of Italy), this currency must be supported through intervention, ie. it must be
bpught by the central bank responsible for the currency which has risen to the upper limit
of its margin.
In addition to this conventional policy of intervention, provision has, however, been made
for preventive measures where a currency deviates unduly (by more than 75% of its
margin) from its average ECU rate. When this threshold of divergence is crossed, the
country concerned is expected to correct the situation by taking appropriate measures
which can cover intervention in varioli,s currencies, domestic economic policy measures (eg.
in respect of interest rates), other economic policy measures (eg. in the field of taxation orPOPULATION AND CIVILIAN LABOUR FORCE (1977 )
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en 1000incomes policy) and, lastly, changes in the central rates themselves. Changes in the central
rate must not become the rule when a country experiences difficulties. Such changes
should be carried out however, where underlying economic circumstances have altered:
they should not be delayed or ruled out for reasons of prestige.
The Central Banks have not yet had any experience of operating the new mechanism
designed to prevent the development of any unduly wide fluctuations. For this reason, the
system will be reviewed after six months. This is all the more important because one
Member State, the United Kingdom, has approved, and belongs to, the new system but
declined to take part in the intervention mechanism from the start.
The funds available for defensive action have been increased significantly under the new
system. Moreover, central banks' currency debts arising from interven.tion now need only
be settled after 45 days rather than the 30 days required before. At the same time short-
term monetary support can now be extended for two further three-month periods instead
of one, with the result that such support can now be granted for nine months in all. The
amount available for short-term support has been increased to 14 000 million ECU and
that for medium-term financial assistance, granted for between two and five years, to
11 000 million ECU. This means that the potential volume of credits available under the
support mechanisms .for defending currencies' central rates against speculation has been
increased almost three-fold. It is ' now easier to repay currency credits since all
participating Member States have agreed to deposit with the European Monetary
Cooperation Fund, on loan, 20% of their gold and dollar reserves and receive in return a
corresponding amount of ECU. They can use the latter to repay 50% of their debts while
the remainder must be covered from national reserves.
The pooling of 20% of Member States' gold and dollar reserves is intended as an initial
. step towards an European Monetary Fund proper, to be set up two years after the
establishment of the EMS. The reserves in this Fund, which will for an initial period
remain the property of Member States' Central Banks, are to available to the Community
without any restrictions, for use as reserve assets and as a means of settlement. Once part
of the currency reserves is managed jointly, the Community will also have to pursue a
coIIUJ:.lon foreign exchange policy towards non-member countries' currencies, in particular
the dollar. In this way, the ECU will gradually help the Community to play an enlarged
role in the field of international monetary policy and in the world economy.
The Community's contribution towards stabilizing the world economy
All the Member States have been surprised by the sharp decline in the value of the dollar, a
sobering experience which impaired economic activity in the Community particularly in
1977 and which has greatly impeded recovery. The call by the President of the European
Commission for a renewed and determined attempt to achieve economic and monetary
union has struck a response, although the new European Monetary System is no more than
a first step along the road to a genuine monetary union. It was acknowledged by the
Heads of State or Government that the Community must istself develop the necessary
monetary and economic policy structures to ensure that it win no longer be at the mercy of
external developments over which its individual member countries have only a small degree
of control.With the first direct elections to the European Parliament, scheduled for June 1979, the
Community will be endowed with a democratic structure. Steps must then be taken to
ensure that the parliamentary control exercised until now at national level will not be
dissipated as a result of the transfer of responsibilities to European level but will be
effectively safeguarded within a wider framework.
The few years remaining before further enlargement of the Community must be used to
ensure that the Community in the 1980s not only becomes a geographically larger entity
but is also strengthened internally. The Community must itself develop the structures that
will permit it to pursue a short-term economic policy of its own and to combat both the
present unwillingness to invest and the current level of unemployment. The rest of the
world expects the Community to play an active part in helping the world economy to climb
out of recession. No-one can or will absolve the Nine of this responsibility.Bibliography
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This booklet gives the basic facts about European economic and monetary union. It traces the
history. the ideals and the aspiration~ of this great project up to the point when practical action
was taken with the creation of a European monetary system in early 1979.